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Introduction 
In 1758 King Frederick the Great of Prussia battled Russian forces at Zorndorf, in
the first major battle of the Seven Years War. In a desperate situation, three times
EDUCATION
THINKING FOR SEAPOWER: EDUCATING AND
ORGANIZING FOR INTELLECTUAL
ADVANTAGE
AUGUST 21, 2019 | GUEST AUTHOR | LEAVE A COMMENT
Center for International Maritime Security
the King sent a message to his youngest general Fredrich Wilhelm von Seydlitz:
“Attack!” Seydlitz demurred, saying the time wasn’t right, his cavalry would be
wasted. Finally the King sent a message that if Seydlitz didn’t attack immediately,
the King would have his head. Seydlitz responded: “Tell the King that after the
battle my head is at his disposal. But in the meantime, I will make use of it.”
 “As an organization, we must anticipate changes in the operating environment
and adapt to maintain an advantage. This can only be done by eliminating out-
dated personnel practices, adopting agile processes and continuously improving
how we operate and fight, it is highly unlikely that the greatest naval strategists
and leaders of our past … would be successful in todays’s bureaucratic environ-
ment. Simply put, the best naval strategists that our naval education enterprise
can produce today will fail without improving the organization in which they op-
erate.”–Education for Seapower Study Report
Recent enthusiasm for critical and strategic thinking as part of a renewed focus on
educating future generations of Navy leaders has rightly brought attention to the
need for the Navy’s PME institutions to be agile and adaptive, and to the role of
thinking and the education of thinkers. Preparing for the future fight means not
just valuing agility in our officers, but also valuing agility in these vital organiza-
tions. It is important to consider several dimensions relevant to the recent discus-
sions, including thinking about thinking, the importance of organizations, and
what our educational institutions can do to better educate strategic and critical
thinkers in the future.
An agile and adaptive response to the Education for Seapower Report (E4S) (as
well as the National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy (NSS))
by our educational institutions can help meet the Navy’s educational goals by build-
ing critical and strategic thinking into curriculum, creating new curriculum concen-
trated on strategic leadership, and by helping inculcate desirable learning attitudes
in officers to help them learn how to be lifelong learners. At the core of these initia-
tives is (re)emphasizing the teaching and nurturing of how to think rather than
what to think, educating for judgment, and cultivating broad, curious, questioning
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minds – characteristics that are at the very core of critical and strategic thinking
capabilities.
Some of these dimensions that are particularly germane to the E4S initiative need
to be clarified. It requires putting E4S in the context of earlier debates within PME
and naval education, as well as some relevant aspects from the civilian domain that
are particularly suitable for educating for the ‘cognitive era.’
By integrating aspects of different institutional and intellectual approaches we hope
to clarify some elements of E4S in the spirit of the interdisciplinary and integrative
approach that E4S calls for. We make some concrete suggestions for how our PME
institutions and the Navy can proactively emphasize (critical and strategic) think-
ing, as well as understanding the vital role of organizing itself in ways that capture
and leverage those capabilities. Our objective throughout is aligned with the E4S
goal of helping the Navy build and retain an intellectual competitive advantage that
is likely to be central to its strategic competitiveness in the future.
The Character of the Contemporary Strategic Context
E4S can be understood as being a key product (along with the NSS and the NDS) of
the current strategic context. All three documents emphasize some of the core di-
mensions of the current and likely future strategic environment that we (as a coun-
try as well as our PME institutions) ought to adapt to and get ahead of.
For the first time since the height of the Cold War the U.S. is realizing it is faced
with adversaries that are providing substantive competition in many areas, ranging
from big competitors who may rival our core strengths to smaller competitors who
may not at first glance rival our strengths but may have studied our weaknesses. In
the presence of multiple different threats our organizations need to be even more
adaptive and flexible than in earlier periods when the threats were more concen-
trated and less diverse.
In these kinds of situations, very successful strategies are two-edged swords be-
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cause they tend to attract the most effort by rivals to mitigate them through imita-
tion or countermeasures. This intensifies the competition further. In short, our ri-
vals are also smart and we can expect that they will, like us, invest in becoming
smarter.
It is in this context that E4S’ proposed investments in intellectual competitive ad-
vantage need to be understood. The Navy (and DOD in general) should expect that
rivals will respond to E4S by ramping-up their own investments in education plus
take actions that attempt to mitigate any advantages the Navy gains from imple-
menting E4S. Competitors will furthermore respond with their own escalations of
this capability.
As a result, to win in the cognitive age it will not be enough simply invest in educa-
tion as a means of creating an intellectual competitive advantage. Easy-to-imitate
educational investments will quickly get matched or neutered by adversaries. If the
Navy wants to develop more sustainable advantages, it will need both to invest in
intellectual advantage, and combine it with ways of organizing that are not easy for
adversaries to counter. These complementary elements will need to be built into
the very heart of our organizational capabilities, not just as simple add-ons. Fortu-
nately, there are some examples from the past that the Navy can draw on for
inspiration.
Getting Thinking Right
Critical and strategic thinking is, and has long been, recognized as important topic
within PME institutions. Key panels (e.g. the Skelton panel) and commissions have
looked into this issue in the past and spurred reorganizations of PME to better edu-
cate thinkers. Furthermore, individuals engaged at all levels of our military institu-
tions and organizations have used and been very aware of the importance of nur-
turing and leveraging thinking.
One outstanding example (of not just recognizing the importance of thinking but
also organizing and educating for it) for the Navy comes from the reorganization of
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the USMC under Gen. Gray. Gray – who is mentioned on the first page of E4S – is
well-known for restructuring the USMC for maneuver warfare and building it into
the heart of the organization’s capabilities. This is an example of strategic leader-
ship that specifically emphasized the role of thinking and judgment in the operat-
ing concepts and documents, and involved a substantial reorganization of the
USMC to properly build and leverage thinking and judging capabilities. The trans-
formation of the USMC of course involved other elements including significant de-
bates in the USMC Gazette about these concepts (sometimes with strong argu-
ments on all sides), an emphasis on free exercises and organizing after-action de-
bates so that good ideas mattered more than rank, and protecting people with good
ideas from being drowned by bureaucracy (usually organizations do the opposite).
A key element in the transformation was the emphasis on education, and Gray’s vi-
sion for thinking and judgement. As he noted:
“My intent in PME is to teach military judgment rather than knowledge.
Knowledge is of course important for developing judgment, but should be taught in
the context of teaching military judgment, not as material to be memorized…The
focus of effort [of PME] should be teaching through doing, through case studies,
historical and present-day, real and hypothetical, presented in war-games, map
exercises, and table exercises, free-play, force-on-force ‘three day wars’ and the
like…As education progresses…the material should grow more complex, but the
essence should remain the same: teach officers and NCO’s how to win in combat by
out-thinking as well as out-fighting their opponents.”
An important insight about the nature of critical and strategic thinking skills the
Navy needs to educate and inculcate comes from LtGen Paul Van Riper, himself a
U.S. Marine, and the first president of Marine Corps University.  Van Riper is, of
course, well-known from the Millennium Challenge wargame for demonstrating
the practical value of effective thinking.  And he has important advice for the type
of thinking that needs to be courted and what should be avoided:
“Considerable contemporary US military literature focuses on the need to develop




critical thinking is a field dominated by analytical procedures. Systems analysis is
at the core of many of these procedures. There are a number of organizations
promoting critical thinking that endorse this analytic focus… [T]here are also
numerous websites devoted to the subject that advocate analysis. I believe students
need to be able to think critically, however they should shy away from the
prescriptive methods advocated by those who champion a form of critical thinking
building on…analysis.”
Van Riper’s insights on the dangers of analysis (and the need for thinking) comple-
ments another well-known thinker in the defense field: Herman Kahn. Kahn, who
in his era was widely viewed as a brilliant thinker,  famously warned against some
of the pitfalls detrimental to good thinking that can arise from over-relying on
analysis.  The evolution of Kahn’s thinking about thinking is a salutary tale for the
PME world. In the 1950s Kahn became RAND Corporation’s top expert in Monte
Carlo simulation (when he was hired his official title had been ‘computer’). But
Kahn’s intellectual development ultimately led him to reject computational meth-
ods for thinking about the future, which “[C]ame to seem like precisely the wrong
approach.”  Among other elements, Kahn became highly critical of over-relying on
models and neglecting model limitations. “Modelism,” as Kahn termed it, meant
that analysts were in fact more interested in their model than the real world, which
stunted their ability to actually understand the real world. Another favorite target
of Kahn’s criticism was the use of statistical uncertainty as opposed to ‘real’ uncer-
tainty. According to Kahn it is always real uncertainty that keeps commanders
awake at night: “How many bombs will the enemy have? What size?…Secret bases?
How good is he? Will his skill change? What surprises does he have? How good are
we? …”  Like Van Riper, Kahn’s example reminds us that in the PME world we
must educate for problems that are analytically tractable where we can, but also ed-
ucate for critical and strategic thinking that recognizes the inherent limitations and
pitfalls of any particular analytical approach to problems.
In a sense we shouldn’t be surprised at the direction these practitioner-thinkers
point to for the kinds of thinking Navy leaders need to excel in. The etymology of







to discern. A study by the American Philosophical Association determined that core
critical thinking skills include inference, evaluation, interpretation, explanation
and self-regulation as well as analysis.  This means that good critical thinking is a
complex bundle of skills that amounts to much more than analytical adeptness
alone. The same principle applies to strategic thinking.
We highlight these issues because of the importance of getting our thinking about
thinking right in the PME community. Others steeped in the military profession
have long emphasized that critical and strategic thinking is not synonymous with
analytic knowledge or the use of analytic tools. Because of this distinction, there are
important differences between educating good analysts and educating good
thinkers. Understanding this issue is easier when remembering the roots and
broader context for the recent calls for more critical and strategic thinking within
the defense and PME communities. The aim is to broaden a student’s mind, nur-
ture and stimulate curiosity, and develop sense of judgment. All these facets have
been emphasized in reports about the recent E4S study.
Active Learning to Develop Active Minds: The Role of Ex-
periential Learning in the Education of Thinkers
“There are no specific set of disciplines that must be mastered to be a strategist.
People who think strategically come from a number of different backgrounds. What
seems central is a cast of the mind that is questioning, eclectic, able to address the
broadest kinds of issues and goals and able to formulate appropriate ways of
achieving those goals…A high tolerance for the uncertainty that necessarily
accompanies any effort to think…is required. Turning to what kind of academic
study or professional training might be useful, I would start with business school
training…”–Andrew Marshall
“[A] most urgent national security task before us today is to intellectually prepare
our leaders for … uncertainty, by equipping them with a strategic framework of how
to think about the future.”–Education for Seapower Report





past, we continue with a few suggestions on how to educate with an emphasis on
thinking for seapower. Our proposal is that developing active minds is best done
through active learning approaches. Two that are particularly worth mentioning
are wargaming and case studies.
The use of cases as a teaching method has an ancient history. Arguably, this ap-
proach has been used in PME at least since von Moltke encouraged debate of sce-
narios in the Prussian academies in the late nineteenth century (and, informally,
probably much longer). In the Prussian academy model, students were posed with
scenarios, invited to suggest solutions to them, and discussed these collectively.
Students were expected to show initiative and disagreement was presumed, even
with the instructor, who was understood to be a comrade among peers.
Cases have been widely adopted in business schools in the last several decades,
where they likewise encourage a combination of student initiative, disagreement,
and vicarious learning from peers. The case methodology can be adapted for much
wider use within the PME community as well. A key idea in cases is to help stu-
dents improve in how to think, not what to think. It can be difficult for educators
used to professing (based on carefully manicured and planned slide decks) to adopt
case teaching as it requires that teachers be comfortable with the vagaries of an
evolving class discussion. However, cases come with a prime benefit in that they
give students ample opportunities to practice thinking through difficult problems
and issues, and debating and directly experiencing how their peers think about
them. There few methods that give students as many opportunities to practice
thinking for themselves on a diverse range of issues in a limited amount of time.
The general point of wargaming and cases is that both are methods of active learn-
ing. For sure there are also other methods of active learning (simulations come to
mind). In our experience case studies are one that works very well, but we would
also encourage PME institutions to experiment with alternatives in an effort to dis-
cover what methods are most effective. Cases can either be decision forcing (What
are you going to do now?) or reflective (What went wrong? What would you have
done differently?). Both work well and a mix is probably optimal.
Conclusion
We have elaborated some central aspects of educating and inculcating good think-
ing in future naval leaders, in line with E4S’ insights into future Navy competitive
advantages. As noted, intellectual competitive advantages are subject to rivalry,
and it would be naïve to think that U.S. rivals are going to sit on their hands and al-
low the U.S. to establish an uncontested lead in this area. Instead, we must think
critically and strategically about how we educate for thinking, and anticipate that
our rivals will compete vigorously in this domain, just as they are doing in others
such as shipbuilding and advanced technology development.
E4S, in pointing toward the importance of thinking, ought to lead our PME institu-
tions to reflect on how they can better educate for this key skill. How do their cur-
riculums support this aspect of E4S and, in turn, the NDS and NSS? How can they
better adapt to the Navy’s emerging needs, or get ahead of those needs? How can
our PME institutions align their own internal thinking and organization to deliver
the vision of E4S?  Hopefully, such issues will be a central element in the develop-
ment of the naval university system going forward.
Finally, in order to realize the potential of its intellectual investments, it is impera-
tive for the Navy also to be organized to better leverage talented thinkers (both in-
dividual and teams) than our rivals are. This entails identifying ways to combine
intellectual resources (which are largely replicable) with organizational capabilities
that are hard for rivals to imitate. The way the Navy puts its intellectual assets to
use depends heavily on these organizational factors. It will do no good to have the
Navy’s exceptional strategic thinkers exhausted by the inertia of a Navy organiza-
tion that is well adapted to yesterday’s strategic environment, but not tomorrow’s.
This means that the realization of E4S depends on more than the Navy’s PME insti-
tutions delivering the education of tomorrow. It also depends on the Navy getting
itself organized to best leverage the strategic thinking capacity its PME institutions
help to deliver. It will take the coupling of both intellectual and organizational re-
sources to generate the kind of competitive advantages the Navy seeks – ones that
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cannot be immediately imitated by rivals.
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